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Non-compliance with EU (environmental) law is often considered to be a 
‘southern’ problem. Because of specific features of their political systems, 
which all four southern European member states allegedly share, they are 
believed to lack the capacity for effectively implementing EU policies. In 
contrast, 1 argue in this paper that, first, there is significant variation in 
compliance with EU environmental laws across the four southern European 
member states. Second, non-compliance is not simply systemic to the political 
systems of the member states. Nor is it an exclusive feature of EU environ­
mental policy-making. As the comparative study on the implementation of six 
different EU environmental policies in Spain and Germany will show, both 
countries implement some policies better than others. My empirical findings do 
not only challenge the assumption that the southern European member states are 
in general incapable of complying with EU environmental law. They also 
indicate that compliance may vary across different policies within one country. 
The paper puts forward a model which allows to explain variation across both 
member states and policies by combining European and domestic factors. It is 
argued that non-compliance is most likely if an EU policy causes a significant 
‘policy misfit and there is no mobilisation of domestic actors pressuring public 
authorities to bear the costs of implementing the ‘misfitting’ policy.
1 I would like to thank Andrea Lenschow, Christoph Knill, Adrienne Héritier, Christian 
Joerges, Geoffrey Pridham, Dieter Wolf, and Michael ZUm for their comments on earlier 
versions of this paper. The empirical results are drawn from my dissertation. The data were 
partly collected within a research project which Christoph Knill conducted at the European 























































































































































































Whereas the overall compliance of the member states with EU environmental 
law is rather low,2 the southern member states have the reputation of being 
particular laggards. The poor implementation record of these countries is 
usually attributed to systemic deficiencies of their political and administrative 
institutions. Lacking administrative capacity, a civic culture inclined to 
individualism, clientelism, and corruption, and the fragmented, reactive and 
party-dominated legislative processes are believed to undermine the public 
willingness and ability to comply with EU environmental law. The difficulties 
of southern European countries in protecting their environment, have been also 
referred to as the ’Mediterranean Syndrome’ (La Spina and Sciortino 1993). The 
Mediterranean member states do face considerable problems in the 
implementation of EU environmental policies. Yet, blaming the ’Southern 
Problem’ (Pridham and Cini 1994) on certain Mediterranean’ characteristics of 
these countries does not only neglect the considerable differences among them. 
This view reproduces specific northern European images of southern European 
politics and ignores the general causes of implementation failure and non- 
compliance arising from the nature and content of EU policies (Pridham 1996).
1 argue in this paper that, first, there is significant variation in compliance 
with EU environmental laws across the four southern European member states. 
Second, non-compliance is not simply systemic to the political systems of the 
member states. Nor is it an exclusive feature of EU environmental policy­
making. As the comparative study on the implementation of six different EU 
environmental policies in Spain and Germany will show, some policies are 
implemented while others are not, or only insufficiently. My empirical findings 
do not only challenge the assumption that southern European member states are 
in general incapable of complying with EU environmental law. They also 
indicate that compliance may vary across different policies within one country. 
This variation cannot be accounted for by either European or domestic factors 
only, as such factors are constant across all six cases under investigation. 
Rather, compliance problems result from an interplay between European and 
domestic factors. If an EU policy challenges existing domestic policies, its prac­
tical application and enforcement impose considerable costs, which the public 
administration is often not inclined to bear. Compliance problems should 
therefore only be expected, if there is a significant ’misfit’ between the EU 
policy and a corresponding national policy. Such policy misfits, however, do 
not necessarily lead to implementation failure and non-compliance. The
2 Environmental policy accounts for over 20% of registered infringements of European law 



























































































mobilisation of domestic actors who pressure public administration to 
effectively apply an EU policy may significantly improve the level of 
compliance.
In order to support my argument about the relevance of policy misfit and 
domestic mobilisation in explaining the level of compliance with EU law, I 
proceed in three steps. First, I use the annual implementation reports of the 
Commission to show that there is significant variation between the different 
member states in their compliance with European environmental law. This 
variation clearly cuts across the north-south divide. Dominant models of the 
implementation of EU environmental policies have difficulties in accounting for 
such variation. Second, I develop an alternative model, which systematically 
links domestic and European factors. Third, I employ this model to explain 
compliance problems of Spain and Germany in the area of environmental 
policy. The empirical findings of the comparison demonstrate that 
environmental leaders and laggards alike face problems in complying with 
European environmental law. German authorities are as little inclined as 
Spanish authorities to comply with EU environmental policies, which do not fit 
the domestic regulatory structures. Significant mobilisation of domestic actors 
(environmental organisations, citizen groups etc.), however, can improve the 
compliance of recalcitrant member state administrations. I conclude with a 
summary of my major findings and some considerations on their implications 
for the research on (improving) compliance.
EXPLAINING THE ‘SOUTHERN PROBLEM’
The Doctor says it is the 'Mediterranean Syndrome'
The literature which argues that implementation failure and non-compliance 
with EU environmental law is a specific 'Southern Problem’ argues that the 
southern European member states share some features of their political and 
administrative systems which render them largely incapable of effectively 
implementing EU environmental policies. First, these countries are said to 
suffer from a considerable horizontal and vertical fragmentation of their 
administrative structures (Pridham 1996: 52). Environmental functions are dis­
persed between a range of national ministries, among which the Ministry of the 
Environment plays a rather weak role. This lack of horizontal co-ordination is 
complemented by a vertical fragmentation in Spain and Italy, where the regions 




























































































Second, it is argued that southern European member states lack the 
administrative capacity to effectively implement European policies. Policy­
making in these countries is reactive in policy style, which often contradicts the 
proactive approach embodied in EU environmental policies (Aguilar Fernandez 
1994; Pridham 1996: 53). Moreover, southern administrations often do not 
possess sufficient technical expertise, staff, and infrastructure to effectively 
apply and enforce EU environmental legislation (Commission 1991: 213; 
Pridham 1994: 89/90; La Spina and Sciortino 1993: 224).
Third, it is suggested that the lower level of economic development in 
southern European states often renders the implementation of European 
environmental policies prohibitive due to powerful economic interests and the 
need to preserve and create employment (Pridham and Cini 1994: 255/256).
Finally, it is stated that political activism and environmental awareness 
are only emerging in southern European societies. Public support for 
environmental protection is low. And environmentalist interests have only 
limited access to public policy-making. With the exception of Italy, which has a 
proper ecologist party (/ Verdi), the main parties have given attention to 
environmental matters only on an ad hoc basis (Pridham and Cini 1994: 262). 
The promotion of economic development is still a priority of both 
administration and the public (Yearley et al. 1994). It is argued that Medi­
terranean countries often do not implement EU environmental policy to improve 
environmental quality per se, but "to be seen as good Europeans, (...) to avoid 
censure, to qualify for advantageous funds" (Yearley et al. 1994: 14). Some 
authors push this cultural argument even further. They imply that the problems 
of the southern member states in implementing EU environmental policy can be 
understood as the result of a fundamental ’clash’ of political cultures. Southern 
European countries have political systems traditionally dominated by patronage, 
clientelism and disrespect for public authority. This Mediterranean political 
culture contradicts the northern European political culture, which is built on 
corporate forms of social organisation and on which EU environmental policies 
are based (La Spina and Sciortino 1993; Lewanski 1993; Aguilar Fernandez 
1994; Pridham and Cini 1994).
There can be no doubt that the southern European countries have 
considerable problems in complying with EU environmental policies. But these 
problems are not part of a homogenous phenomenon or a "disease called 
Mediterranean Syndrome" (Pridham 1994: 268), like some authors suggest (La 
Spina and Sciortino 1993). In contrast, I argue in this paper that, first, the 
southern European countries are diverse with respect to their political and 




























































































whereas Italian and Spanish regions enjoy considerable competencies in this 
area. Spain, Italy and Portugal have proper ministries for environmental policy, 
which are rather small, while in Greece, the environment is adjunct to a large 
ministry comprising other areas. Unlike Greece and Italy, the public 
administration in Spain is rather efficient (Pridham 1996: 68). Spain and 
especially Italy, which has the forth-largest economy in the EU, are more 
industrialised than Portugal and Greece.3 Clientelism and administrative 
lethargy might still prevail in some Mediterranean regions, notably in the South 
of Italy (Grote 1997). But it would be difficult to make this argument for the 
whole of Italy or Spain.
Second, if there exists something like a ‘Southern Problem’ or a 
‘Mediterranean Syndrome’, why do we find considerable variation in 
compliance among and within the southern European member states in the area 
of EU environmental policy? For example, the average transposition rate of 
Spain (90%) and Portugal (90%) compares well against the UK (90%), 
Luxembourg (91%), Germany (92%), and France (94%), and is only topped by 
the Netherlands (96%) and Denmark (99%). At the same time, Greece (84%) 
and Italy (75%) find themselves on the very bottom of the list. When it comes to 
the infringement proceedings, Greece and Italy account for the highest number 
of both Article 169 warning letters and reasoned opinions. Spain also received a 
high number of Article 169 warning letters but was issued far less reasoned 
opinions than Greece and Italy. Portugal has the fifth lowest number of Article 
169 letters (after Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and France) and the 
second lowest number of reasoned opinions (after Denmark). Whereas Italy, 
together with Belgium, tops the list of references to the ECJ and judgements, 
Greece and Spain score better than Germany and the Netherlands. Portugal 
accounts for the lowest number of references to the European Court of Justice, 
together with Denmark.
In sum, there is no consistent outcome with respect to the compliance of 
the four southern European countries with EU environmental law. The figures 
for Greece and Italy indicate an overall low level of compliance, whereas 
Portugal puts up with the leader countries. Spain finally, seems to oscillate 
between the laggards and the leaders. This cross-national variation, which cuts 
across both the Mediterranean countries and the 'North-South divide', does not 
only challenge the Mediterranean Syndrome assumption but the whole North- 
South dichotomy along which implementation and compliance problems are 
discussed in the literature.
3 The per capita income in Italy is twice as big as in Greece and Portugal, whereas Spain lies 




























































































Figure 1: Average Transposition Rate (1990-1995)
Sources: Commission 1993, 1995.
Figure 2: Average Percentage of Article 169 Letters (1988-1992)
Average Percentage ot Article 169 Letters (1988-1992)
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Figure 3: Average Percentage of Reasoned Opinions (1988-1992)
Average Percentage of Reatoned Opinions (1988-1992)
I  Ftercentage
C o un try
Sources: Commission 1993, 1995.
Figure 4: Average Percentage of References to the European Court of Justice 
and Judgements (1988-1992)_______________________________________
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Figure 5: Average Percentage of Suspected Infringements* (1988-1997)
Average Percentage of Suspected Infringements by Country (19M-1997)
Sources: Commission 1993, 1998
* Suspected infringements refer to complaints to the Commission, questions and petitions 




























































































TOWARDS A GENERAL APPROACH OF NON-COMPLIANCE
There have been several attempts to develop more general models of effective 
implementation in EU environmental policy, which reach beyond a simplistic 
North-South dichotomy. Such models draw on two groups of factors, which 
Geoffrey Pridham distinguished as genetic and systemic causes of im­
plementation problems (Pridham 1996). Genetic causes arise from the specific 
structural character of EU environmental policy-making. Firstly, EU envi­
ronmental policies deal with matters of high legal and technical complexity 
giving rise to questions of interpretation and issues of technical application, as 
well as difficulties in co-ordinating the different national authorities in the 
implementation process. The imprecision of many EU directives, ambiguous 
objectives, open texture, and the freedom of the member states to enact 
transposing legislation in the form most appropriate to their national conditions 
have often allowed member states to delay implementation or to make 
exceptions (Pridham 1996; Collins and Eamshaw 1992; Macrory 1992; Jordan 
1999). Secondly, the EU does not have effective monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms. The Commission has the power to bring infringement proceedings 
against member states under Art. 169 of the Treaty. And the new Art. 171 of the 
Maastricht Treaty introduces fines against the member states not complying 
with EU environmental legislation. However, the Commission itself recognises 
that infringement proceedings and fines are not an effective means for enforcing 
EU environmental policies (Commission of the European Communities 1996: 5; 
cf. Pridham 1996; Macrory 1992; Haas 1998; Jordan 1999).
Systemic or domestic accounts of implementation problems refer to the 
specific features of the political and administrative institutions of the individual 
member state. Pridham identifies four types of systemic or domestic causes of 
implementation problems. 1) political/structural variables referring to problems 
of institutional fragmentation (horizontal and vertical); 2) administra- 
tive/procedural variables drawing attention to questions of administrative style 
and administrative culture as well as of the efficiency of monitoring systems 
and the degree of technical expertise; 3) economic variables pointing at the 
relevance of the costs of applying a policy together with the interests of those 
affected by it; and 4) cultural/attitudinal variables referring to the problem of 
how different conceptual approaches of national administrations can lead to 
different interpretations of EU policies in the implementation (Pridham 1996; 
cf. Rehbinder and Stewart 1985).
Genetic and systemic factors alone do not explain implementation failure. 
If implementation problems essentially arose from the specific nature of EU 




























































































implementation deficiencies, which is clearly not the case (see Figure 1-5). The 
‘systemic’ or domestic variation of the EU member states with respect to the 
fragmentation of their political systems, their administrative capacity, their level 
of socio-economic development, or their environmental activism do not match 
the variation in their implementation records which we observe in Figure 1-5 
either. There is no direct correlation between certain political/structural, 
administrative/procedural, economic or cultural/attitudinal characteristics of the 
member states and their compliance record. For example, Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, and Italy have strongly decentralised territorial structures. Whereas 
vertical fragmentation is discussed as a problem for implementation in Belgium 
and Italy, it is not in Germany (Haigh 1986; Pridham and Cini 1994), and to a 
lesser extent in Spain (Pridham 1996: 53). Although environmental policy is 
horizontally co-ordinated by a national ministry in Portugal and in Greece, both 
countries find themselves at opposite ends of the implementation ranking list. 
Italy has the forth largest economy in the EU and the worst implementation 
record. Portugal and Greece qualify as the poorest EU member states, but 
Portugal joins the leaders and Greece the laggards. Belgium and above all, the 
UK possess a higher administrative capacity than Greece and Italy. But their 
implementation records look in some respects very similar. More importantly, 
systemic factors cannot account for intra-state variation across different 
policies. Why do countries like Spain, Germany, or the UK comply with some 
EU environmental policies better than with others?4
Some scholars stive to integrate generic and systemic factors in ex­
plaining the level of member state compliance with EU environmental law 
(Pridham 1996; Mendrinou 1996; Haas 1998). Yet, such ‘integrative’ 
approaches to implementation failure and non-compliance hardly specify how 
European and domestic factors interact. Nor can they explain the variation in 
effective implementation and compliance across different policies within one 
single country as found in the empirical study of this paper.
In sum, we need a model, which does not only allow to explain variation 
in compliance among the different EU member states, especially across the 
North-South divide. It must also be able to explain variation in compliance with 
different policies within a single member state. The next section attempts to 
develop such a model by systematically linking European and domestic factors 
in the implementation of EU policies.




























































































Pressure from Above and from Below: The Pull-and-Push Model
The Pull-and-Push Model’ is based on two major propositions. First, 
compliance problems only arise if the implementation of European policies 
impose considerable costs5 for the public administrations of the member states. 
The less a European policy fits the legal and administrative structure of a 
member state, the higher the adaptational costs in implementation and the lower 
the willingness of the public administration to comply. Second, the willingness 
and/or ability of the public administration to bear the costs of implementing 
poorly fitting EU policies is influenced by additional pressure for adaptation 
from ’below’ where societal actors may mobilise against ineffective imple­
mentation at the domestic level (pull), and from ’above’ where the European 
Commission may introduce infringement proceedings (push).
External Pressure for Adaptation: Policy Misfit as the Necessary Cause of Non- 
Compliance
EU environmental policy making is strongly influenced by the regulatory 
competition among highly regulated countries such as Germany, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, or the UK. These member states seek to bring EU 
policies in line with their own administrative traditions and regulatory standards 
in order to minimise costs of institutional adjustment and to avoid 
disadvantages for their economies (Héritier 1996). This regulatory competition 
has given rise to a 'patchwork' of EU environmental policies (ibid.), where 
different regulatory approaches are often linked even within one single policy. 
As there is no consistent regulatory framework in EU environmental policy, the 
individual member states face different levels of pressure for adaptation, 
depending on the extent to which an EU policy 'fits' the national approach and 
standards. The more an EU policy challenges or contradicts the corresponding 
policy at the national level, the higher the need for a member state to adapt its 
legal and administrative structures in the implementation process (Knill 1997: 
19). Legal and administrative changes involve high costs, both material and 
political, which public authorities are hardly inclined to bear.
It is assumed that compliance problems only occur if there is pressure for 
adaptation. If an EU policy fits the problem solving approach, policy 
instruments and policy standards adopted at the national level, there is no 
reason why public administration should resist implementation. The EU
5 Costs are not merely understood in economic terms. They can be also political, e.g. with 
respect to public support (endangering jobs), or political credibility and reputation (being a 




























































































legislation can be easily absorbed into the existing legal and administrative 
structure. Only if the implementation of an EU policy requires considerable 
legal and administrative changes imposing economic and political costs on the 
public administration, non-compliance should be expected. Thus, there is hardly 
any incentive for a local administration to practically apply environmental 
standards if monitoring requires considerable financial and human resources, or 
if enforcement challenges powerful economic interests.
External pressure for adaptation arises from a ’misfit’or incompatibility of 
the problem solving approach, policy instruments and/or policy standards of an 
EU policy and the corresponding policy at the national level. Only if an EU 
environmental policy challenges one (two, or all) of these three elements, i.e. 
imposes significant costs of adaptation, its implementation gives rise to 
problems for the national administrations.
a) Problem solving approach refers to the general understanding of an 
administration how to tackle problems of environmental pollution. Two ideal 
types of problem solving approaches can be conceptualised:6
• a precautionary, technology- and emission based approach, which is based 
on imposing legally binding standards to be uniformly applied by all polluters 
irrespective of the differing local quality of the environment and the application 
of the available technology irrespective of the cost involved compared to the 
potential benefit for the environment
•  a reactive, cost/benefit- and quality based approach, which builds on the 
setting of quality standards for a certain area and on balancing the costs of a 
technology against potential environmental improvements
b)  Policy instruments refer to the ‘techniques’ applied to reach a policy goal by 
inducing certain behaviour in actors. They can be classified according to the 
following dimensions:
• regulatory, command and control instruments, which regulate behaviour 
through prescriptions and prohibitions threatening negative sanctions in case of 
non-compliance vs. market-oriented: offering financial incentives and 
participatory, communicative: providing information, encouraging public 
participation, deliberation
• substantial regulation by legally binding standards vs. procedural regulation 
through procedures, such as the balancing of costs and benefits or the public
6 The classification draws on the categories developed in a research project on the impact of 
national administrative traditions on the implementation of EU environmental policy 
conducted at European University Institute, Florence in April 1997 (Knill 1997; cf. Héritier, 




























































































participation in authorisation procedures.
c) Policy standards, which can be quantitative or qualitative in nature (see 
above), refer to the guiding values set by a policy, e.g. for air or water quality. 
Yet, policy misfit causing external pressure for adaptation does not necessarily 
lead to implementation failure and non-compliance. The mobilisation of 
domestic actors who pull the policy down to the domestic level by pressuring 
the public administration to properly apply it, may persuade national public 
actors "to give priority to environmental policy and to embrace new directions" 
(Pridham 1994: 84). Legal action or public campaigns of environmental groups 
against the member state administration denouncing it for not complying with 
EU legislation, often provide an additional ’incentive’ for better compliance. 
Such domestic mobilisation very often triggers additional external pressure for 
adaptation from ’above’by the European Commission which opens infringement 
proceedings against recalcitrant member states.
Domestic Pressure for Adaptation from 'below': The Pull-and-Push-Factor
Internal pressure for adaptation arises from domestic mobilisation. EU policies 
usually have direct affects on domestic actors, imposing constraints for some 
and offering opportunities to others. It is typical for (EU) regulatory policies 
(like environmental policy) that their costs are allocated to those actors who are 
in charge of implementation and to those who are the target group of the policy. 
The domestic actors (public and private) who have to bear the costs of EU 
environmental policies (often subnational authorities and economic actors), tend 
to resist the practical application and enforcement of a policy. This resistance, 
however, can be counterbalanced by other domestic actors who strive to ’pull 
down’ an EU policy to the domestic level by pressuring the public 
administration to practically apply and enforce it. This domestic pressure can be 
exercised through various channels (Pridham 1994: 94-98). First, political 
parties can raise concerns about the proper implementation of policies vis-à-vis 
the government, like the Catalan socialists did in 1989, when they questioned 
the non-application of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive in the 
authorisation of a motorway cutting through a nature reserve.7 Second, 
environmental organisations can act as a 'watchdog' drawing the attention of 
both public authorities (national and European) and the public opinion on
7 First, the socialists raised the issue in the Catalan parliament and subsequently made a 
complaint to the Commission and the European Parliament. The Commission decided to 
freeze the loan granted to the promoter of the project by the European Bank for Investment 
and Reconstruction and asked for the elaboration of an environmental impact assessment 




























































































incidents of non-compliance with EU environmental legislation. Third, the 
media can play a crucial role for domestic mobilisation. Media coverage often 
decides whether an environmental issue gains public attention and support. And 
fourth, business and industry can mobilise in favour of compliance with a 
policy. The Eco-Audit Regulation is an example for economic interests 
promoting rather than obstructing the effective implementation of a misfitting 
EU environmental policy. Domestic mobilisation is most effective if it is able to 
link-up with European institutions, reinforcing external pressure for adaptation 
due to policy misfit by initiating infringement proceedings.
In sum, if public authorities get ’sandwiched’ between adaptational 
pressure from above (EU) and below (domestic actors), EU environmental 
policies have a good chance to be more effectively implemented, even if 
implementation involves high costs due to policy misfit.




























































































This Pull-and-Push Model generates the following hypothesis about when non- 
compliance is most likely to occur:
The higher the pressure for adaptation and the lower the level of domestic 
mobilisation, the more likely is non-compliance.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EU ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN 
SPAIN AND GERMANY
For the empirical case study, six different EU environmental policies were 
selected:
« The Drinking Water Directive,8
The Directive on the Combating of Air Pollution of Industrial Plants,9
• The Large Combustion Plant Directive,10
• The Access to Information Directive,11
•• The Environmental Impact Assessment Directive,12
• The Eco-Audit Regulation.13
The six policies exert different degrees of pressure for adaptation on the legal 
and administrative structures of Spain and Germany.
In order to assess Spain’s and Germany’s compliance with these six policies, I 
will analyse legal transposition, practical application and enforcement in each 
case. A policy will be considered as effectively implemented and complied with 
if 1) it is completely and correctly transposed into national law, 2) conflicting 
national provisions were amended or repealed, 3) the administrative infra­
structure and resources were provided to put the objective of the policy into 
practice, and 4) the competent authorities encourage or compel others to comply 








14 Hence the concern of the case study lies with the output rather than the outcome of the 




























































































The Directive on the Quality of Water on Human Consumption (Drinking Water 
Directive) adopted in 1980, establishes legally binding, substantive standards to 
reach a certain level of drinking water quality. It also sets procedural 
regulations of how often and by what means the monitoring of the water quality 
is to be carried out.
Spain: Neither Pull nor Push
At first sight, the Drinking Water Directive does not produce any substantial 
policy misfit in Spain. Four years before its accession to the EC, Spain 
systematically enacted a list of binding standards for drinking water quality and 
set up procedures for monitoring compliance. The Spanish legislation 
anticipated most of the European regulations and requirements for drinking 
water. Consequently, the actual implementation of the Drinking Water Directive 
after Spain’s accession to the EC did not produce any significant pressure for 
adaptation. No major implementation costs appeared to be involved. The legal 
and administrative structures for regulating and monitoring the quality of drink­
ing water had already been in place for some years.
In how far Spain is practically applying the Directive, however, is 
difficult to assess. Neither the Spanish authorities and the local water suppliers 
nor the European Commission and the Spanish environmentalists report any 
problems in complying with the standards of the Drinking Water Directive. But 
data on water quality are hardly available. Spanish authorities admit that the 
municipalities often lack the technical and financial resources for properly 
monitoring the drinking water quality. While Spain formally complies with the 
requirements of the Directive, monitoring suffers from an uneven geographical 
distribution of measurement stations and a measurement technology which is 
often not up to standard (OECD 1997; Instituto para la Politica Ambiental 
Europea 1997). The measurement of some parameters set by the Drinking Water 
Directive, for instance, requires a sophisticated technological equipment that is 
not only expensive but also demands manpower and expertise which often lacks 
at the subnational level. Both the Commission and the Spanish authorities are 
aware of the problem. But as domestic actors, including environmentalists, do 
not consider compliance with the quality standards of the Drinking Water 
Directive to be a problem (interviews, 3/97), Spain has not faced any internal or 
external pressure which would have forced public authorities to address the 
problem of inefficient monitoring.




























































































The Drinking Water Directive in principle corresponds to the German approach 
in drinking water policy. But some of the standards as well as certain procedural 
requirements of the Directive produced a certain policy misfit. First, unlike the 
German Chinking Water Ordinance, the quality standards of the Drinking Water 
Directive do not only account for public health requirements but also aim at 
protecting the environment. As a result, the Drinking Water Ordinance of 1980, 
which is exclusively oriented towards public health concerns, does not regulate 
many of the European parameters. Second, particularly the European limit 
values for pesticides are for more stringent than German regulations. The direct 
enforcement of the directive would have required the immediate closure of 
numerous wells in Germany (Miiller-Brandeck-Bocquet 199o: 143). As a result 
of these misfits, Germany transposed the directive only with a six years delay in 
1986. But the revision of the Drinking Water Ordinance still omitted almost half 
of the parameters listed in the Directive. Moreover, Bund and the Lander agreed 
to enforce the pesticide standards only from 1989 on in order to give agriculture 
some time for adjustment. The Lander also had the discretion to grant ex­
emptions for certain limit values if this did not constitute a risk for public 
health. While German environmental group supported this gradual adaptation to 
European standards (interviews, 1/97), the Commission referred what it 
considered an incomplete transposition of the Directive to the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) in 1989. Facing a conviction by the ECJ, Germany finally gave 
in and revised its drinking water policy in 1990. Despite formal compliance, 
administrative practice has not changed much. Compliance with certain limit 
values remains a problem (Landerarbeitsgemeinschaft Wasser 1997) as a result 
of which the Lander administrations still negotiate temporary exemptions with 
the water suppliers.
In sum, the Drinking Water Directive caused misfits for both Spain and 
Germany which resulted in problems of compliance. Spain, however, has not 
faced any additional pressure for adaptation, neither internal nor external, to 
upgrade its monitoring system. Spanish environmental groups do not perceive 
water quality as a problem. And the Commission has not denounced Spain for 
any infringements of the Directive either. Germany did not face any internal 
pressure for adaptation either as environmentalists largely supported the gradual 
adaptation to European standards. But the Commission exerted considerable 
external pressure for adaptation due to the obviously incomplete transposition 
of the Directive. This ‘push without pull’ brought Germany finally in formal 
compliance with the Drinking Water Directive. In lack of domestic 
mobilisation, however, full compliance in practical application and enforcement 
remains unlikely.




























































































The Industrial Plant Directive, adopted by the Council in 1984, provides a 
procedural framework regulation for preventing and reducing air pollution 
caused from industrial plants. The authorisation of a new plant, or of the 
substantial modification of an already existing plant is only to be granted if 1) 
all appropriate preventive measures against air pollution were taken, including 
the application of the best available technology not entailing excessive costs, 2) 
the emission of the plant will not cause any significant air pollution, and 3) 
none of the emission or air quality limit values applicable will be exceeded.
The Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCP) of 1988 extends the 
requirement of the best available technology, though not exceeding excessive 
costs (BATNEEC), to the measuring methods used for monitoring compliance 
with air pollution standards. Most importantly, the LCP provides an annual 
reduction target for emissions the member states have to comply with.
Germany: Complete Fit
The two directives on air pollution control were very much modeled on the 
German emission and technology based approach in combating environmental 
pollution, as a result of which they did not produce any kind of adaptational 
pressure for Germany (Héritier et al. 1996).
Spain: Complete Misfit
The Industrial Plant Directive: Neither Pull nor Push
At first sight, Spanish legislation on combating air pollution appears to fulfil the 
major requirements of the Industrial Plant Directive. A closer look at the 
regulations, however, reveals important deficiencies. First, the formal 
requirements of the impact assessment as well as the consideration of corrective 
measures are certainly not sufficient to meet the respective regulations of the 
Directive. Second, dispersion measures do not really qualify as appropriate 
preventive measures against air pollution. Third, the importance of 
technological progress in combating air pollution is acknowledged in Spanish 
legislation. But any reference to available technology is linked to considerations 
about how environmental legislation must always be a compromise between 
public health considerations on the one hand, and economic imperatives and the 
available technology on the other hand. Moreover, the criterion of "best 
available technology" (BAT) is nowhere defined nor is its application explicitly 
required.




























































































Due to these considerable misfits between the problem solving 
approaches in the EU legislation and Spanish regulatory practice, the Industrial 
Plant Directive has never been transposed into Spanish law. Thus, it does not 
come as a surprise that those parts which do not correspond to Spanish legis­
lation are not practically applied either because of the high costs involved. In 
order to avoid additional working load and to escape opposition of industry, 
public administration has refrained from systematically considering preventive 
measures in the authorisation of industrial plants. Nor is BAT enforced on 
Spanish industrial plants. Environmental groups have been aware of the 
ineffective implementation of the Industrial Plant Directive. But they refrained 
from mobilising against public administration because they strive to concentrate 
their resources on more "important issues" (interviews, 3/97). Air pollution is 
not a high ranking issue neither in the public opinion nor on the political agenda 
of the environmentalists. The Commission in tum, has apparently accepted 
Spain’s claim that existing legislation already comply with the requirements of 
the directive.
The Large Combustion Plant Directive: Pull without Push 
Spanish legislation provides both quality and emission standards in order to 
control air pollution. It also sets requirements for progressively reducing the 
level total emissions. Yet, the S02 emission limit values for old as well as for 
new combustion plants were nowhere near the limit of the LCP Directive. In 
other words, there was a clear misfit between European and Spanish substantial 
air pollution standards. Moreover, as Spain did not implement the Industrial 
Plant Directive, Spanish air pollution control legislation was still missing the 
precautionary and technology-based problem solving approach adopted by the 
LCP Directive.
In order to bring Spanish emission limit values for combustion plants up 
to European standards, and to incorporate the total emission reduction levels for 
existing plants, Spain transposed the LCP Directive into Spanish law. The legal 
text is almost a literal copy of the Directive. It is to simply replace existing 
national legislation in all the parts in which it is not conform with the Directive. 
The ’automatic’ suspension of conflicting national provisions brought Spain in formal 
compliance with the LCP Directive. But it resulted in a lack of domestic regulations 
which would operationalise certain regulations of the Directive, such as the 
application of BATNEEC in reducing emissions and monitoring compliance.
Due to a considerable policy misfit with respect to policy standards and 
BATNEEC requirements, the practical application and enforcement of the LCP 




























































































and NO* emission by half till 2003. And second, Spain has to up-grade its 
measurement technology in order to meet the BATNEEC requirements.
Spain is the third largest S02 emitter in OECD Europe (after Germany 
and the UK). Compliance problems with (S02) emission standards of the LCP 
Directive for existing plants have been basically limited to Spain’s two largest 
central power stations, As Pontes (Galicia) and Andorra (Aragon), which 
account for more than half of the total S02 emissions in Spain. Andorra is 
considered the second most contaminating central power station in Europe. 
Following the requirements of the LCP Directive, the Ministry of Industry and 
Energy developed a National Plan, whose foreseen reductions went well beyond 
those required by the LCP Directive and could only be achieved by 
systematically applying BAT, or, by importing better quality coal (interview, 
6/98). Both central power stations bum to 80 percent indigenous high sulphur 
coal, and coal mining is the major source of socio-economic development in the 
areas where the central stations are located. This was the reason why the 
Spanish administration initially did not take any measures to practically apply 
and enforce the ambitious emission reductions of the National Plan.
Yet, at the beginning of the 1990s, massive Waldsterben (forest dying) 
was observed in the neighbouring provinces of the Andorra plant. Local 
municipalities, environmental groups (among others Greenpeace), trade unions 
and political parties started to mobilise against the pollution caused by the 
central power station. After a fierce public campaign, which included a 
environmental liability law suit (cf. Font Borras 1996, 250-71), the management 
of the Andorra power station agreed to implement an environmental plan which 
anticipates S02 emission reductions that supersede those required by the LCP 
Directive by 40 percent. This over-compliance with the Directive is explained 
by the continued domestic mobilisation due to massive environmental 
deterioration which linked to the pollution caused by the power station. 
According to a recent OECD report, Spain succeeded in significantly reducing 
its S02 emission over the last years. The reduction, however, has been mainly 
achieved by substituting indigenous low quality coal through higher quality 
imports, not by introducing BAT (OECD 1997). Spanish administration and 
industry alike justify the non-introduction of BAT on the grounds of too 
extensive costs as most of the existing combustion plants date back to the 1960s 
and 1970s (interviews, 3/97). The considerable costs involved have also 
prevented the necessary upgrading of the Spanish system for monitoring air 
quality in order to make it comply with the BAT requirement of the Directive.
To conclude, while the two European directive on combating air pollution 




























































































adaptation on Spanish air pollution policy. The required modernisation of 
Spanish industrial plants imposes high costs which neither industry nor public 
authorities are inclined to bear. As a result, the Industrial Plant Directive has not 
been implemented at all. The LCP Directive has simply been absorbed into the 
Spanish system leaving substantial parts non-applied. Only when societal actors 
mobilised for a more effective air pollution control, Spanish industry and public 
authorities started to take action as a result of which Spain has considerably 
reduced its emissions over the last years.
The Environmental Impact Assessment Directive: Misfit in Spain and 
Germany
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) constitutes an instrument of 
procedural regulation, which assesses in a systematic and cross-sectoral way the 
potential impact of certain public and private projects on the environment. The 
basic principle of the EIA Directive is that any project which is likely to have 
significant effects on the environment is subject to an environmental impact 
assessment prior to authorisation by the competent authority, in which the 
concerned public may participate and whose results have to be made public.
Spain: Diffuse Pull and Reluctant Push
Before the EIA Directive, there was no comprehensive environmental impact 
procedure in Spain. Different sectoral environmental regulations required the 
assessment of certain environmental impacts of a planned project. But the 
Spanish EIA lacked the explicit precautionary approach of the Directive. The 
requirements for information to be provided by the developer are much less de­
manding. The period of public information and consultation is shorter. 
Requirements for corrective measures are lax to non-existent. Cross-media 
effects are not systematically considered. Due to these misfits between 
European and Spanish EIA regulations, Spain transposed the EIA Directive by a 
proper law.
Yet, the new Spanish law does not correctly transpose the EIA Directive. 
The Commission has repeatedly reprimanded Spain for not defining conditions 
under which projects listed in Annex II of the Directive have to be made subject 
to an EIA (Commission 1995: 63). After the Commission had sent a Reasoned 
Opinion in 1992, the Spanish government finally agreed to remedy the matter 
by 1994. Yet, the Spanish EIA legislation has not been modified so far. As a 
result the Commission is considering to (rejopen the infringement proceedings 




























































































While legal transposition is already incomplete, practical application has 
also been little effective. Administrative changes have been small. The EIA pro­
cedure was incorporated into the existing administrative procedures. 
Consequently, there is a lack of sufficient manpower and expertise, especially if 
the relatively short time period for the assessment and the cross-media approach 
of the Directive is taken into account. Environmental authorities do not ensure 
the good quality of Environmental Impact Studies which the promoter of a 
project has to provide (discussion of alternatives e.g.). Nor are the competent 
authorities willing to mobilise additional resources to adequately assess the 
Environmental Impact Studies and enforce corrective measures. The vast 
number of the solicited projects receive a positive EIA, and many projects still 
proceed without any authorisation, or only ask for it when they are already 
implemented. Local authorities, in charge of monitoring, often cover up for this 
’circumvention’ of authorisation procedures in order not to suffer socio-eco­
nomic disadvantages.
Domestic actors have been mobilising against the ineffective application 
of the EIA Directive trying to pull the policy down to the domestic level. 
Environmentalists and citizen groups, often in coalition with local 
administration, increasingly use EIA to oppose the authorisation of public and 
private projects. Denouncements and petitions made to the Spanish parliament 
with respect to infringements of the EIA regulations account for about 30% of 
the total number in the environmental sector. Together with the Habitat and the 
Wild Bird Directive, EIA also represents the highest number of Spanish 
complaints to the Commission (about 30%). In a number of cases, domestic 
mobilisation led to the imposition of corrective measures, and sometimes even 
to the rejection of a project. Yet, environmental and citizen groups have only 
limited resources. Domestic mobilisation is usually restricted to issues which 
seriously affect the ‘backyard’ of a large group of people at the local level. As a 
result, the internal pressure for adaptation has so far been too diffuse to 
systematically improve compliance with the EIA Directive.
Germany: Combined Pull and Push
In Germany, the concept of EIA forms part of sectoral authorisation procedures, 
such as in air pollution. Yet, the highly sectorised German legislation does not 
fit the integrated, cross-media approach of the EIA Directive. Nevertheless, 
German administrators have considered the transposition of the directive 
unnecessary claiming that existing legislation already covered all the provisions 
of the Directive even going beyond some requirements. Transposition was 
delayed by two years. As a result, several environmental organisations filed 




























































































confirmed by the European Court of Justice. When Germany finally enacted a 
law in 1990, transposition was still incomplete as more than one third of the 
Annex II projects were omitted. In light of several rulings of the European 
Court of Justice and the revision of the EIA Directive in 1997, Germany is 
currently revising its EIA legislation to bring it in formal compliance with EU 
regulations.
While approaching formal compliance, practical application and 
enforcement is still deficient. The administrative directive 
(Verwaltungsvorschrift) regulating the practical application of EIA in Germany 
only came in 1995, 10 years after the EIA Directive had been passed. Moreover, 
the administrative directive waters down the cross-media, interdisciplinary 
approach of the EIA Directive as well as the requirements for public 
participation. As a result, practical application of EIA is reduced to compliance 
with environmental standards which exist for the different media (Bohne 
forthcoming). Changes to administrative practice have been marginal.
The ineffective application of the EIA procedure has provoked the 
opposition of domestic actors. Yet, like in Spain, environmentalists and citizen 
groups lack the resources to systematically appeal against the deficient 
application of the EIA regulations. And even if they succeed in bringing cases 
to the court, German jurisdiction tends to support the restrictive interpretation 
of the EIA followed by the public administration.
In sum, the EIA Directive has produced considerable policy misfit in 
Spain and Germany, which resulted in problems of compliance in both 
countries. Spanish and German environmentalists alike mobilised against the 
ineffective implementation of the EIA Directive. While Spanish environmental 
groups have been less successful in inducing the Commission to exert 
additional pressure for adaptation, several infringement proceedings forced 
Germany to remedy its incomplete transposition legislation. Given the limited 
resources of local environmental and citizen groups in both countries, domestic 
adaptational pressure for improving practical application and enforcement of 
the EIA procedure is still diffuse and hence not very effective.
The Access to Information Directive: Misfit in Spain and Germany
The Access to Environmental Information Directive (AI) adopted in 1993 shall 
broaden public access to environmental information as to increase transparency 
and openness thereby encouraging citizens to participate more actively in the 
protection of the environment. Its procedural regulations require any public 




























































































sponsibility for the environment, have to make such information available to 
any natural or legal person at his or her request without his or her having to 
prove "direct effect". The Directive defines some conditions under which 
information may be refused. It must be possible, however, to seek judicial and 
administrative review against the refusal of, or failure to provide a requested 
information. Beside the obligation to make environmental information available 
upon request, member states are called upon to actively provide general 
information to the public.
Spain: Increasing Pull and Push
In Spain, access to information held by public authorities has traditionally been 
highly restricted and not freely available either to ordinary citizens or to non­
governmental organisations (NGOs). Spanish legal provisions and 
administrative practices granted access to information only in justified cases 
and are thus in sharp contrast with the AI Directive which demands general 
access to information for anybody only to be refused in justified cases. This 
’misfit’ produces a high pressure for adaptation in the implementation of the AI 
Directive. The costs of such adaptation do not lie so much with an additional 
working load for the administration. Broader access to information provides the 
public with an effective means of controlling administrative behaviour such as 
monitoring compliance with environmental legislation. It also allows for more 
transparency in administrative decision-making. Not surprisingly, Spanish 
administration, not being used to public scrutiny, has shown little enthusiasm in 
complying with the AI Directive.
When the AI Directive had come into force in December 1992, the 
European Commission started receiving complaints from Spanish 
environmental NGOs about the non-implementation of the Directive. In March 
1993, the Spanish government notified the Commission that the AI Directive 
had been implemented by the new Law on the Legal Regime of Public 
Administrations and Common Administrative Procedures passed in 1992. Yet, 
this law did not properly implement the AI Directive, as a result of which 
complaints to the Commission continued. In March 1994, the Commission 
opened an infringement proceeding against Spain sending an Art. 169 letter. 
Spanish NGOs strove to invoke the "direct effect" of the AI Directive, and the 
Commission also intervened in some cases of refusal of information. In view of 
this pressure from above and from below, the Spanish government prepared a 
new Draft Law on the Right of Access to Information on the Environment, 
which was enough for the Commission to stop the infringement proceeding. In 




























































































The transposition law closely follows the structure and content of the 
Directive. But it still does not fully implement the European norm. First, the 
right of access to information is not granted to everybody but restricted to 
nationals or residents of states forming part of the European Economic Area 
(EEA). Second, a request not answered within two months is to be considered a 
refusal, even if no justification is provided. Finally, authorities can make 
charges for supplying requested information. There is no mentioning that such 
charges should not exceed a reasonable cost. Each authority is free to make its 
own charges and there is no obligation to inform the requester in advance of the 
charges that will me made.
In light of the still incorrect transposition of the AI Directive, complaints 
of societal actors to the Commission have continued. In February 1996, 
Greenpeace presented a third complaint to the Commission arguing that Spanish 
legislation did still not effectively implement the AI Directive. This complaint 
resulted in another infringement proceeding against Spain. The Environmental 
Ministry is currently working on a revision of the transposing legislation.
Like formal transposition, practical application and enforcement has not 
been very effective in Spain. Practical arrangements for regulating access to 
information are missing. Most requests are simply not answered. Or, high 
charges are imposed. National environmental groups have organised nation­
wide campaigns against such infringements of the AI Directive. They provide 
information brochures which explain the rights of access to information and 
include standardised forms by which information can be requested as well as 
appeals against refusal made. Documentation centres collect cases of non- 
compliance with AI requirements. At the local level, however, public demand 
for environmental information is still low. Like in the case of the EIA Directive, 
local environmentalists and citizen groups have only limited resources to push 
their rights to information against the resistance of public administration.
Germany: Increasing Pull and Push
The AI Directives constitutes for Germany as much a misfit as for Spain. The 
comprehensive right to access to environmental information which the Directive 
grants irrespective of interest and procedural context completely contradicts the 
German administrative tradition based on the confidentiality of information in 
possession of public authorities. The principle of ‘restricted access to records’ 
grants the public access to information only in justified cases, that is in the 
context of certain administrative procedures and when third parties can claim a 
‘legitimate’ interest. The procedural regulations of the AI Directive which aim 




























































































command-and-control approach of German environmental legislation and, 
consequently, faces strong opposition by public authorities.
The transposition of the Directive was delayed by 1,5 years. As a result, 
German environmental groups filed several complaints with the Commission. 
When the Commission opened an infringement proceeding, Germany finally 
enacted the Environmental Information Act (Umweltinformationsgesetz) which, 
however, does not fully comply with the Directive. First, the definition of public 
authorities subject to the AI regulations is far more limited than in the Directive. 
Second, there are no criteria according to which public authorities can declare 
an administrative procedure as ongoing and hence exempt it from the AI 
requirements. Third, the competent authority has a choice of how to supply 
requested information and thus does not necessarily have to grant access to 
records. Finally, there are no clear criteria for charges which public authorities 
can impose for the provision of information. In light of the incorrect 
transposition, complaints to the Commission continued. In 1995, the 
Commission opened another infringement proceeding against Germany which is 
still pending before the European Court of Justice. In anticipation of the ruling, 
German environmental authorities are already working on a revision of the 
Environmental Information Act.
Incorrect transposition gave rise to even lower compliance in practical 
application and enforcement. The vagueness of the German regulations allows 
public authorities to interpret them against the ‘spirit’ or even the wording of 
the Directive. Like in Spain, information is often denied or high charges 
imposed. German environmental groups have strongly mobilised against the 
ineffective application of the AI regulations. Like their Spanish counterparts, 
they organised information campaigns, issued publications, launched several 
series of systematic requests for information, collected and documented cases of 
refusal, lodged administrative appeals, filed law suits, and sent complaints to 
the Commission. Domestic mobilisation has been stronger than in Spain, given 
the superior s resources of German environmental NGOs. But its effect has (so 
far) been largely restricted to an improvement in formal compliance (still to 
come).
The AI Directive is, like the EIA Directive, a clear example for an EU 
policy causing serious problems of compliance for environmental leaders and 
laggards alike. Spanish and German authorities resorted to similar strategies in 
trying to circumvent the requirements of the Directive. And Spanish and 
German NGOs employed similar means in their attempt to pull the AI Directive 
down to the domestic level. While their repeated complaints resulted in 




























































































compliance, domestic mobilisation against ineffective practical application and 
enforcement is too diffuse to bring about any systematic improvements.
The Eco-Audit Management and Audit System Regulation: Policy Misfit 
But No External Pressure for Adaptation
The Community Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), established by a 
Regulation in 1993, is a voluntary instrument which is to provide incentives for 
enterprises to introduce an environmental management system for assessing and 
improving industrial activities and providing the public with adequate 
information. Having direct effect, the EMAS Regulation does not require 
transposition. However, the member states are supposed to establish a system of 
registration for sites which implement EMAS, as well as of accreditation of 
independent environmental inspectors and the supervision of their activities. 
Given its voluntary character, EMAS cannot really cause compliance problems. 
Yet, it presents in interesting case as EMAS appears to be the exception which 
confirms the rule.
Spain: No Pull - no Push
Despite their elements of self-regulation and communication, which do not fit 
the regulatory command and control approach in Spanish environmental policy, 
management and audit systems are not entirely new to Spain. Spain did not only 
adopt the ISO 14001 system. Like the UK and Ireland, it also developed a 
national management system. But while EMAS is far more demanding than 
both the international and the Spanish system, its implementation exerts no real 
pressure for adaptation because of its voluntary character.
Spain fully incorporated the required system of registration, accreditation 
and supervision into its already existing ‘infrastructure for the quality and safety 
of industry' for ensuring certain quality and safety standards applied to 
industrial activities. While sites implementing EMAS have to register with the 
environmental authorities, accreditation and supervision of the environmental 
verifiers is handled by the national accreditation society ENAC (Entidad 
Nacional de Acreditacion), a private non-profit organisation in which both 
public and private actors are represented. All in all, the implementation of 
EMAS gave only rise to marginal legal and administrative changes.
Spanish industry appears to be very reluctant in implementing the Eco- 
audit management system. Costs of implementation are high, and so are 




























































































environmental legislation. So far, very few enterprises have registered in Spain. 
Those which did are predominantly multinational companies.
One can argue to what extent EMAS fits the Spanish legal and 
administrative structures. The effective implementation of EMAS would have 
certainly required some legal and administrative changes which go beyond the 
mere absorption into the existing structures. There are, for instance, no clear 
criteria for the accreditation and supervision of the auditors. Yet, the Spanish 
industry shows little interest in pulling EMAS down to the domestic level. 
Given the absence of any domestic mobilisation in favour of an effective 
application of EMAS, public authorities have little incentive to undertake 
necessary changes.
Germany: Pull without Push
The German position towards EMAS was very hostile in the first place. The 
principle of industrial self-regulation does not fit the German interventionist, 
command and control approach in environmental policy, especially as EMAS 
does not contain any material regulations. This was also the reason for the 
scepticism of German industry which was concerned that EMAS could bring 
more rather than less regulation at the national level. But the EMAS Regulation 
was finally passed. While the German Ministry of Environment strove to absorb 
EMAS as far as possible into the existing regulatory structures, industry insisted 
on an ‘innovative’ implementation which implied substantive legal and 
administrative changes. This ‘puli’ or domestic mobilisation by German 
industry, despite its initial opposition, is explained by the fact that industry 
increasingly perceived EMAS as a chance of substituting for state control in 
complying with environmental standards.
In light of the mobilisation of industry, Germany, unlike Spain, did not 
simply integrate the system for registration, accreditation and supervision into 
existing structures of state regulation. Instead, industry is in general responsible 
for the registration of sites implementing EMAS and the accreditation as well as 
the supervision of environmental verifiers. Yet, the professional criteria to be 
met by the verifiers for accreditation and the guidelines for their supervision are 
set by a pluralistic expert committee consisting of representatives of industry, 
trade unions, environmental organisations, and the environmental and economic 
administration of Bund and Lander. The mixed system of industrial self­
regulation and moderate state intervention do not only go far beyond the legal 
and administrative changes required by the Regulation. It has also proved to be 
very successful. Germany accounts by far for the highest number of registered 




























































































To conclude, EMAS did not fit either Spanish or German state tradition 
of intervention and regulation. While the voluntary character of EMAS largely 
precludes any compliance problems, it illustrates the importance of domestic 
mobilisation. In Spain, industry showed little enthusiasm for EMAS as a result 
of which the policy was merely absorbed into existing regulatory structures. In 
Germany, however, industry pulled the policy down to the domestic level 
pressing for an ‘industry-friendly’ implementation which resulted in the highest 
level of ‘compliance’ in the EU -  despite the initial policy misfit.
CONCLUSION: ON NORTHERN LEADERS AND SOUTHERN 
LAGGARDS
The case study on the implementation of six different EU environmental 
policies clearly indicates that environmental leaders and laggards face similar 
problems of compliance if an EU policy does not fit their legal and 
administrative structures. With the exception of the two air pollution policies in 
Germany, the selected policies exerted pressure for adaptation on the legal and 
administrative structures of Spain and Germany alike which resulted in 
significant compliance problems in both countries. In all 10 cases of policy 
misfit, Spain and Germany were very reluctant to introduce the necessary legal 
and administrative changes and mobilise additional resources in order to ensure 
complete and correct transposition as well as effective practical application and 
enforcement. Compliance only improved when domestic actors - in particular 
environmental organisations and citizen groups but also industry as we saw in 
the EMAS case - mobilised and exerted internal adaptational pressure on public 
authorities and policy-makers. Societal actors striving to pull a European policy 
down to the domestic level usually mobilise the Commission to push the policy 
from above by opening infringement proceedings. The Drinking Water 
Directive in Germany is the only case in which the Commission took action 
which was not preceded by massive complaints of NGOs. And in case of 
EMAS, the mobilisation of German industry was sufficient to bring about legal 
and administrative changes which ensure a high level of compliance. The 
combined adaptational pressure from above and from below explains the (albeit 
slowly) emerging compliance of Spain and Germany with the Access to 
Information and the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive, as well as 
Spain's ‘overcompliance’ with the Large Combustion Directive. In absence of 
both ‘pull’ and ‘push’, member state compliance with misfitting policies is 
likely to remain low like in case of the Industrial Plant Directive, the Drinking 

































































































Policy Misfit/ No 
Domestic Mobilisation
- DW in Spain
- Industrial Plant in 
Spain
- EMAS in Spain
- DW in Germany
Policy Misfit/ Domestic 
Mobilisation
- LCP in Spain
- AI in Spain
- AI in Germany
- ELA in Spain
- ELA in Germany
- EMAS in 
Germany
No Policy Misfit/ No 
Domestic Mobilisation
- Industrial Plants 
in Germany
- LCP in Germany
DW = Drinking Water; LCP = Large Combustion Plant; AI = Access to Information; EIA = 
Environmental Impact Assessment; EMAS = Eco-Audit and Management System.
The findings of the comparative study demonstrate two important limits of 
existing approaches to implementation failure and problems of compliance. 
First, there is considerable variation, not only between states but also between 
different policies within one state. While Germany did not have any problems in 
effectively implementing the two Air Pollution Directives, its compliance with 
Environmental Impact Assessment and Access to Information is as poor as in 
Spain. I argued that this variation could only be explained by taking into 
account the different levels of external and internal pressure for adaptation.
Second, there is no systematic North-South dichotomy in accounting for 
compliance problems. It is striking how similar the implementation patterns of a 
‘leader’ and a ‘laggard’ can be. Despite being an environmental leader, 
Germany is facing considerable misfits in the implementation of EU envi­
ronmental policies. And like in Spain, German policy-makers and public 
authorities first respond to such pressure for adaptation by striving to absorb 
‘ill-fitting’ policies as to avoid adaptational costs. Only when there is 
significant pressure from below and from above, administrative resistance 
against necessary legal and administrative changes is overcome. Here, Spanish 
and German NGOs resort to similar mobilisation strategies. And like in Spain, 





























































































It is certainly true that Germany overall has a better compliance record 
than Spain. The only cases of persistent non-compliance are the Spanish. This 
variation, however, is not the result of a general incapacity of Spain to 
effectively implement EU policies. First, due to the regulatory competition in 
European policy-making (Héritier 1996), politically less powerful countries 
with less advanced environmental policies, like Spain, are likely to face more 
cases of policy misfit than more influential member states, like Germany or the 
UK, which often succeed in uploading their advanced policies to the European 
level. Regulatory competition, however, does not only mean that countries with 
lower environmental standards and less bargaining power will have more 
difficulties in down-loading EU policies. It also explains why environmental 
leaders and power players, such as Germany, face increasing problems in 
complying with EU environmental law, which once and so often reflects the 
more reactive, cost/benefit, quality based approach predominant in British 
environmental policy-making with its instruments of procedural regulation.
Second, the level of domestic mobilisation is lower in countries like 
Spain, where environmental organisations and citizen groups have only limited 
resources and environmental awareness is only emerging. As a result, domestic 
mobilisation is often diffuse and, hence, less effective. While (trans)national 
environmental NGOs become more and more influential, local groups are still 
weak. This is, however, a problem in Germany, too. Spanish and German NGOs 
have been quite successful in mobilising against the deficient transposition of 
misfitting EU policies. Improving formal compliance is often achieved through 
concentrated lobbying activities at the national and European level. Moreover, 
the Commission is far more able to trace failures in legal transposition. Yet, 
formal compliance is increasingly less a problem (see Figure 1). Public 
authorities often manage to circumvent or water down European regulations in 
practical application and enforcement, as Germany does in case of 
Environmental Impact Assessment and (since 1990) Drinking Water and Spain 
in case of Air Pollution and Drinking Water. Here, domestic actors are crucial 
for detecting issues of non-compliance as the Commission simply lacks the 
capacity to control member state compliance beyond the level of correct legal 
implementation. (Improving) formal compliance does not necessarily lead to 
(more) effective practical application and enforcement as the cases of the 
Drinking Water Directive in Spain and Germany clearly show. Thus, 
compliance with the Environmental Impact Assessment and the Access to 
Information Directive will only slowly improve, despite approaching formal 





























































































The explanation of compliance problems as the result of significant 
policy misfit (adaptational costs) and the absence of domestic mobilisation in 
favour of effective implementation does not only systematically link European 
and domestic factors of implementation failure. It can also account for 
variations between different states as well as between different policies within 
individual member states. Most importantly, the ‘pull-and-push’ model 
presented in this paper provides an alternative to the North-South dichotomy in 
the explanation of compliance problems emphasising the general 
implementation problems confronted by environmental leaders and 
environmental laggards alike. Strengthening domestic societal actors by 
providing them with financial resources, information, and expertise could be a 
crucial factor in improving member state compliance with European law.
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